Abstract. A method for verifying hybrid systems is given. Such systems involve state components whose values are changed by continuous (physical) processes. The Verification method is based on proving that only those executions that satisfy constraints imposed by an environment also satisfy the property of interest. A suitably expressive logic then allows the environment to model state components that are changed by physical processes.
Introduction
What executions of a concurrent program are possible and what properties are satisfied by that program may depend on the environment. Consider a system to maintain a given water level in a tank. Under computer control, a pump causes water to be added and a valve causes water to be drained. Correctness of the control program depends on the environment--in particular, on the rate at which the pump adds water and the rate at which the valve drains water. In fact, correctness of the control program is defined in terms of permissible states of the environment, because correctness is based on the water-level. One simply cannot specify or reason about such a control program without saying something about its environment.
In [10] we introduced two principles for verifying programs whose executions are affected by an environment. The state of the environments considered in [10] change discretely along with each atomic action of the program. Nevertheless, our principles were shown to be usable for verifying real-time behavior of concurrent programs, because schedulers and resource limitations that affect execution time can be regarded as part of the environment. In this paper, we extend those results to environments having variables that change value continuously, as time passes. The result is a new verification method for hybrid systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the principles introduced in [10] . Section 3 presents a simple concurrent programming language, giving a plausible semantics for programs that will control physical processes. Our specification language is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 explains how invariance-based proof methods for verifying safety properties can be used for verifying hybrid systems as well. Section 6 contains an example. And, Section 7 puts our work in context. A soundness proof of our verification method appears in an appendix.
Formalizing and Exploiting the Environment
Any method for program verification comprises: a programming language, a property language, and a way to prove that a program P satisfies a property ~.
Program P and the property ~ define sets [[P]] and [[~]] of behaviors, where a
behavior is a mathematical object that describes an execution of the program.
A program P satisfies a property r denoted (P,r E Sat, exactly when all behaviors of P are permitted by ~:
(P,~) C Sat if and only if [[P]] C_ [[r
The environment in which a program executes defines a property too. This property contains behaviors that are not precluded by one or another aspect of the environment. For example, with the water tank discussed above, the environment defines a property containing those behaviors where the water level changes continuously and only by amounts consistent with the pump's rate and the valve's rate. Behaviors in which the water level changes abruptly are not in this property.
For a property g defined by an environment, the feasible behaviors of a program P under $ are those behaviors of P that are also in 8: [ 
~en---,S,~od
The skip statement does not change any program variable; some non-zero time elapses. Assignment x := e changes variable x to be the same value as expression e. The value of e is computed at some instant after execution of the assignment is started; x is changed instantaneously after some additional time elapses. Thus, execution of our assignment involves performing two atomic actions. 
Program Semantics using Control-Graphs
We represent a program using a control graph--a collection of nodes and edges, not unlike a flowchart. Each node models a delay prior to executing an atomic action; each edge models execution of an atomic action and describes a state change that occurs (instantaneously). Thus, skip gives rise to a single node followed by a single edge, whereas an assignment x := e gives rise to a sequence of two nodes--one whose outgoing edge computes the value of e and a successor whose outgoing edge updates x.
Formally, a control graph is a tuple (V, E, Ventry, Eexit), where: -V is a set of nodes.
-E is a set of edges. Each edge (v, v') is labeled with a Boolean expression g and a multiple assignment op (possibly empty, i.e., skip). When convenient, we denote such a labeled edge by the 4-tuple (v, v~,g, op) . We call v the source node of the edge and call v ~ the destination node. Destination node v / must be either an element of V or the distinguished node "?'.
Ventry is a set of entry nodes. Ventr~ C V.
-
E~it is a set of exit edges, those edges with "?" as their destination node.
E~it C_ E.
As an example, consider sequential subprogram $1 of Figure 1 . The control graph of $1 is given in Figure 2 . We use double circles to indicate entry nodes, and Appendix A gives a procedure for translating a program into a control graph. When that procedure is used, the control graph CGp for any program P: $111S2 contains exactly two disconnected subgraphs, each with a single entry node: one entry node is for subprogram $1 and the other is for subprogram $2.
States~ Phases~ and Traces
A slate is a mapping from variables to values. The variables are partitioned into program variables, environment variables, control variables, and clock variables. Program variables (which are typeset using lower-case identifiers) appear in assignments, as targets and/or expressions. Execution is the only way to change program variables. In the program of Figure 1 , ps and vs are examples of program variables.
Environment variables may appear in guards and the expressions of assignments but may not appear as targets of assignments. We typeset environment variables using upper-case identifiers, to distinguish them from program variables. Environment variables are presumed to be changed by the environment, Finally, clock variables captur e elapsed time since various control graph nodes were last active. Clock variable now records the elapsed time since the program started execution. Clock variable 1" v contains the elapsed time since control variable v last changed from false to true and has value .l_ if v has never become true. Thus, Tv contains the elapsed time since node v last became active. And, clock variable ~v contains the elapsed time since the start of control variable's v last change from true to false; it has vMue _l_ if v has never been r Execution of a program is modeled as a sequence of phases [18, 12] . Each phase gives values to the variables over some period of time. We denote a phase as a pair ([r, r'], f), where [r, rq is a closed interval of the reals and f is a mapping from [r, r'] to states. Phase ([r, r'], f) associates state f(t) with any time t such that r < t < r'.
A trace r is a possibly infinite sequence of phases 
fi(t)(e) = fi(ri)(c) + (t -r,).
A clock variable c that is not reset in state fi(r~) also satisfies fi(r~)(c) --
The following diagram summarizes how the starting and ending states of adjacent phases in a trace are related. A dashed arrow indicates changes to environment and clock variables; a solid arrow denotes changes to program variables, control variables, and clock variables that occur by traversing a control graph edge. The trace begins at state fl (0) and the state changes continuously according to the function fl, until time r~. At time r(, an instantaneous state change occurs corresponding to execution of some atomic action. This causes the state to change from fl(r~) to f2(r2), based on the assignment labeling the edge of the control graph that is traversed and the resetting of certain clock variables. 
/1(o)
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Properties
We now introduce a language for expressing properties. We restrict consideration to safety properties [15] , properties that assert some "bad thing" does not happen during execution. Informally, formula Inii :=~ rnI defines the property containing all traces r such that (i) Init does not hold initially on r or (ii) I holds throughout 7. Thus, I implies that the "bad thing" being prescribed by the safety property has not happened.
In formula Init ~ rnI, we call Init and I assertions and assume that they are defined by the grammar below. There, we assume x is a program variable, X is an environment variable, and v is a control variable. We also assume a set C of real constants. Finally, op~el denotes a relational operator and Oparith an arithmetic operator.
A ::Top~,T'I~AIAAA'](Vx.A:A' )
T ::C I Varl~(Var) lToparithT'lT{T'~l fT'T" (4) Var::xlX Iv[ ~vl ~vlnow
For any variable a, term d (a) is the first derivative of a with respect to time.
The past term T{T'{ equals the value of T at the (past) state existing T' units T' II ago. And, fT T is the value of the definite integral of term T" between T and T I" We formalize the value AdT(T) of a term T in a finite trace 7-inductively.
z4r(c)(r) = c

AdT(Var)(T) : fi(r~)(Var), where ([ri, r~], f{) is the last phase in r
Mr(~(Var))(,) :
umA~_o "~'( V~ v~ A~)
,'Xr M:r(T opo,-.h T')(~-) = .Mr(T)(7-) opo,..~ Mr(T')(7-)
AJT(TiT'{)(r) = ~,IT(T)(<.N_~r(T,)(T))
M~(I~' T")(r) : r "~T(T')(~) .~(T")(7-..,)dt J~ar(T)(r) (5)
The value A, IA(A) of an assertion A in finite trace r is a Boolean function defined in the usual way using AdT.
An assertion A is defined to be valid iff for every finite trace r, Ad~t(A)(r) = true. We assume a deductive system is available for proving validity of assertions. 
Hybrid-system verification is thus equivalent to establishing (P, DEny, Init DI) 9 ESat. According to (2) 
A hybrid proof outline, like an ordinary proof outline, associates assertions with control points. In particular, a hybrid proof outline associates an assertion with each node in a control graph. Assertions are of a restricted form so they cannot be invalidated by changes to environment variables (which might occur while a given node of a control graph remains active).
RI: Clock variables c and environment variables X appear only in past terms
having the form X (c] . Such terms do not change value during a phase, even as clock variables advance and the environment variables are updated. EL2: Terms using derivatives are not permitted.
Formally, a hybrid proof outline is a triple 7/ --(CGp, 7, Env) where COp is a control graph for a program P, 7 maps each node v among the nodes V of CGp to an assertion 7, satisfying R1 and R2, and DEny is a hybrid-environment property. The assertion
I~:
A v ~ ~ (10) vEV is called the invarian~ of 7l. Property [ [7/] ] is defined to be the set of all finite and infinite traces v such that (i) v does not satisfy hybrid-environment property
For an assertion A, we write A[x :: e] to denote the textual substitution of every free occurrence of x in A by e. The following theorems give conditions for verifying (8) and (9) above, and therefore they give a method for establishing is valid. The proofs of both theorems are in Appendix B.
Example
To illustrate the approach, we return to the control program in Figure 1 . Subprogram $1 reads the water level (WL) in a tank. If the level is too low--less than or equal to 50--then a pump is activated, causing water to be added, until the level reaches 95. Sub-program $2 monitors a control button. When the button is pressed, $2 toggles the valve state. The two components for the control graph of this program appear in Figures 2 and 3 . A hybrid-environment property nEnv for this system asserts that changes to the water level are based on the pump rate and valve state. We assume a pump with throughput 0. Notice that real-time execution bounds are defined using an assertion about the environment. This seems natural, since there is nothing intrinsic about the program text that supplies such bounds. Rather, the bounds are an artifact of the particular processor executing the program. Moreover, associating the bounds with the environment makes it possible to use our verification framework for different real-time behaviors.
The property that we wish to establish is that our control program ensures that the water-level remains between 48 and 98. We formalize this property as Init ~ rnI, where: To prove that this property holds, we construct a hybrid proof outline 7~, with the following mapping 7 that assigns an assertion to every node in the control graph. Let ~ denote the zor logic operation. According to Theorems 1 and 2, we must then check the set of verification conditions listed in Appendix C.
Discussion
Our work is perhaps closest in spirit to the various approaches for reasoning about open systems. An open system is one that interacts with its environment through shared memory or communication.
The execution of such a system is commonly modeled as an interleaving of steps by the system and steps by the environment. Since an open system is not expected to function properly in an arbitrary environment, its specification typically will contain explicit assumptions about the environment. Such specifications are called assume-guarantee specifications, because they guarantee behavior when the environment satisfies some assumptions. Logics for verifying safety properties of assume-guarantee specifications are discussed in [9, 14, 21] ; liveness properties are treated in [11 3, 23] ; and model-checking techniques based on assume-guarantee specifications are introduced in [6, 11] . Our approach differs from this open systems work both in the role played by the environment and in how state changes are made by the environment. We use the environment to represent aspects of the computation model and the scientific laws governing the behavior of environment variables--not as an abstraction of the behaviors for other agents that will run concurrently with the system. This generalizes what is advocated in [8] for reasoning about fair computations in temporal logic. Second, in our approach, every state change obeys constraints defined by the environment, while in the open systems view only state changes that are attributed to the environment must obey those constraints.
Interest in verification of hybrid systems is an outgrowth of work in verifying real-time bounds for concurrent programs. A rather substantial literature exists on the subject; see [7] for a collection of surveys. The problem of reasoning about arbitrary continuous-valued state components was first discussed in [24] , in connection with process control program for railroad control. That work was ultimately published in [20] .
Our underlying semantic model--traces--is similar to the hybrid traces of [18] . A hybrid trace consists of continuous and discrete moments. A continuous moment is mapped to a single state, and a discrete moment may be mapped to several states. With our notion of traces, every intermediate discrete moment is mapped to exactly two states.
Our computation model--control graphs and hybrid-environment properties--share features with phase transition systems [18, 12] , hybrid statecharts [19] , and hybrid automata [2] . Our computation model differs in its separation of program execution from changes to the environment. The control graph models program execution and the hybrid-environment property models state changes to the continuous-valued variables. One advantage of this separation is that changes to the computation model and to the physical laws can be easily accommodated. A second advantage is that assertions associated with control points in a program (i.e., nodes in the control graph) can be simpler because they need not explicitly mention environment state components.
Our specification language contains constructs for derivatives and integrals. Such constructs also appear in the specification languages of [4, 12, 17, 5, 22] . Our verification methodology extends the Hoare-logic methodology of [16] to hybrid system. Deductive-systems for proving safety properties of hybrid system are also presented in [19, 13] . Our work differs mainly in its independence from a particular computation model.
A Constructing a Control Graph
The control graph CGs that corresponds to a sub-program S is defined inductively, as follows: -For S a skip: Define V = {vo}, VentrV = {v0}, E = {eo} where eo :
(vo, ?, true, skip), and Ee,:it = {eo}. -For S an assignment x := e(~): 6 Define V = {v0,v,}, Ve,~trv = {v0}, and E = {eo,el} where e0 = (v0,vl,f~'~te,t := y), el --(Vl,9.,tT"ue, x := e(t)), and Eezit = {el}. -For S astatement composition $1; $2: Let (V1,EI,V 1 1 entry, Legit) be the control graph for S1 and let (V 2 E 2, 2 2 , Vintrv , E,~:it) be the control graph for $2. (v,v',g, op) [3(v,9, g, op) EEe~itand EVlnt~y} -For S an iteration do G1 ~ $1~G2 ~ $2 od: r Let ~ be the list of variables mentioned by G1 and G2. Let 
